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Representing the EU in the area of CFSP: Legal and Political 
Dynamics 
 
Hylke Dijkstra   and Peter van Elsuwege    * **
This is a draft chapter forthcoming in: 
Steven Blockmans and Panos Koutrakos (Eds) (2018) Research Handbook on The EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, Edward Elgar. 
Abstract 
The European Union is represented on the international stage by different actors and in different 
constellations. This chapter tries to understand how the EU representation in the field of CFSP is 
organised and applied in practice. It starts by discussing representation from a conceptual 
perspective by outlining various legal and political dynamics. The chapter continues by analysing 
three instances of EU external representation in the area of CFSP: first, multilateral representation 
of the EU in international organisations and fora; second, bilateral representation of the EU in other 
countries; third, ad hoc representation and mediation attempts by the EU in international and 
regional conflicts. The chapter concludes that we need to consider the interaction between law and 
politics to understand EU external representation. It is not simply about legal competences, power 
politics, or the external environment, but often a combination of these factors which affects the 
ability of the EU to represent itself externally. 
 Department of Political Science, Maastricht University*
 Professor of EU law, Ghent European Law Institute (GELI), Ghent University**
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3.1 Introduction 
When Serbia and Kosovo started a dialogue to improve bilateral cooperation in March 2011, the 
European Union's (EU) High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy together with 
the officials in the European External Action Service (EEAS) were tasked to facilitate the process.  1
When the crisis in Ukraine escalated in February 2014, following the earlier Maidan protests, the 
foreign ministers of France, Germany and Poland flew jointly to Kyiv to mediate between 
government and opposition on behalf of the EU.  When the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 2
concerning the nuclear programme of Iran was reached in July 2015, the signatories included Iran, 
the permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, Germany and the EU.  3
 The EU is therefore represented on the international stage by different actors and different 
actor constellations. This not only goes for highly visible ad hoc attempts of conflict resolution, but 
also for permanent forms of diplomacy. EU representation, for example, varies across international 
organisations.  Within international organisations, it can vary even across the different committees.  4 5
Similarly, the upgrading of the approximately 140 EU delegations after the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) 
has taken place unevenly. The result is that these EU delegations perform very different functions 
depending on their location. The EU delegation in Baku is not the same as the one in Beijing.  EU 6
external representation thus varies significantly and it is not immediately clear why.  
 This chapter tries to understand how the EU representation in the field of Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) is organised and applied in practice. This question is hardly new. The 
issue of EU external representation has been at the heart of policy discussions about European 
foreign policy cooperation at least since the 1970s. And the academic literature discusses inter-
 Julian Bergmann and Arne Niemann, 'Mediating International Conflicts: The European Union as an Effective 1
Peacemaker?' (2015) 53 Journal of Common Market Studies 957
 Federal Foreign Office of Germany, Crisis diplomacy in Ukraine (21 February 2014) <http://www.auswaertiges-2
amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Aktuelle_Artikel/Ukraine/140219_Ukraine.html> accessed 4 January 2016
 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Vienna, 14 July 2015, <http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statements-eeas/3
docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf> accessed 2 March 2017; see also the 
contribution of E. Denza in this volume. 
 E.g. Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E Smith (eds), The European Union at the United Nations Intersecting 4
Multilateralisms (Palgrave Macmillan 2006); Knud Erik Jørgensen (ed), The European Union and International 
Organizations, (Routledge 2009); Knud Erik Jørgensen, Sebastian Oberthür and Jamal Shahin (eds), 'The 
Performance of the EU in International Institutions' (2011) 33 Journal of European Integration 599; Knud Erik 
Jørgensen and  Katie Verlin Laatikainen (eds), Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International 
Institutions: Performance, Policy, Power (Routledge 2013)
 E.g. Within the UN General Assembly, see Katie Verlin Laatikainen, 'The EU Delegation in New York: A Debut of 5
High Political Drama' in David Spence and Jozef Batora (eds), The European External Action Service: European 
Diplomacy Post-Westphalia (Palgrave Macmillan 2015), tables 10.1 and 10.2
 Rosa Balfour and Kristi Raik, Equipping the European Union for the 21st century: National diplomacies, the 6
European External Action Service and the making of EU foreign policy (Finnish Institute of International Affairs 
2013); Frauke Austermann, European Union Delegations in EU Foreign Policy: A Diplomatic Service of Different 
Speeds (Palgrave Macmillan 2015); David Spence and Jozef Batora (eds) The European External Action Service: 
European Diplomacy Post-Westphalia (Palgrave Macmillan 2015)
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institutional politics and the consequences for EU external representation.  The chapter makes three 7
contributions. First, it seeks to provide a comprehensive overview of EU external representation in 
the field of CFSP, whereas other publications focus on other areas or specific cases. Second, it 
approaches the question from a distinctly legal-political perspective, where others have stayed 
within disciplinary boundaries. Third, it focuses on the Treaty of Lisbon and the post-Lisbon era, 
whereas most of the scholarship is concerned with the pre-Lisbon institutional set up of external 
representation. 
 The chapter starts by discussing EU external representation from a conceptual perspective. It 
outlines various legal and political dynamics behind the research question who represents the EU. It 
continues by analysing three instances of external representation. First, multilateral representation 
of the EU in international organisations and forums. Second, bilateral representation of the EU in 
other countries. Third, ad hoc representation and mediation attempts by the EU in international and 
regional conflicts. The conclusion sheds further light on the interaction between law and politics in 
understanding EU external representation. 
3.2 EU External Representation in Law and Politics  
EU external representation can be studied through the disciplinary lenses of law and politics. The 
EU Treaties contain various legal provisions determining which actor represents the EU on which 
issue. Similarly, from a political perspective, one can examine the leadership of actors in EU 
external representation, their effectiveness and instances of bureaucratic politics. Rather than to 
analyse legal rules and political dynamics separately, however, we study their interaction. The legal 
provisions in the Treaties are the result of political choices and many legal rules are codifications of 
previous norms and practices. Political actors furthermore tend to use legal provisions to their 
advantage. This conceptual section starts with some historical background before outlining key 
legal aspects of the Treaty of Lisbon. It continues by pointing out how political science theories 
complement legal insights. 
3.2.1 Development of EU External Representation prior to the Lisbon Treaty 
The first instances of external representation predate the establishment of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) with the Treaty of Rome in 1958. Jean Monnet, as President of the High 
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was keenly aware of the importance 
of transatlantic relations and opened an ECSC information office in Washington, DC in 1954.  Over 8
the next 50 years, the European Commission continued this practice and opened delegations around 
 E.g. David Allen, '“Who speaks for Europe?”: the search for an effective and coherent external policy' in John 7
Peterson and Helene Sjursen (eds), A common foreign policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP 
(Routledge 1998); Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis, 'Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade 
Authority in the EU' (1999) 37 Journal of Common Market Studies 477; Inge Govaere, Jeroen Capiau, An 
Vermeersch, 'In-Between Seats: The Participation of the European Union in International Organisations' [2004] 
European Foreign Affairs Review 155; Hylke Dijkstra, 'EU External Representation in Conflict Resolution: When 
does the Presidency or the High Representative Speak for Europe?’ (2011) 15 European Integration online Papers 
(EIoP) <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2011-001a.htm> accessed 24 February 2017; Rikard Bengtsson and David Allen, 
'Exploring a Triangular Drama: The High Representative, the Council Presidency and the Commission' in Gisele 
Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Carolin Rueger (eds) The High Representative for the EU Foreign and Security 
Policy: Review and Prospects (Nomos 2011); Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Sophie Meunier, 'Speaking with a 
single voice: internal cohesiveness and external effectiveness of the EU in global governance' (2014) 21 Journal of 
European Public Policy 961; Christine Kaddous, (ed.), The European Union in International Organisations and 
Global Governance (Hart Publishing 2015)
 European Commission, Taking Europe to the World: 50 years of the European Commission's External Service 8
(Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004)
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the world. Diplomatic relations were initially established with important trading partners and 
countries receiving development assistance. This reflected the EEC’s competence in external 
commercial policy as well as the Commission's role in development cooperation following the 
Lomé agreements of the 1970s. By the time that the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009, the 
Commission had more than 130 delegations in non-member countries and international 
organisations.  9
 In parallel to the external representation of the EEC, there was a need to represent European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) established in 1970. The administration of EPC had been delegated to 
the six-monthly rotating Presidency. It was put in charge of external representation with the London 
Report of 1981.  This arrangement was formally confirmed with the Single European Act (SEA).  10 11
With the Treaty of Maastricht of 1993, EPC transformed into the CFSP as a separate ‘pillar’ of the 
EU. Concomitantly, a purely intergovernmental system of cooperation became part of a legal 
system established by treaty law.  This was also visible with respect to external representation. 12
Article J.5. of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) not only articulated the role of the 
rotating Presidency and the supportive role of the incoming and preceding Presidencies under the 
so-called ‘Troika’ formula but also explicitly provided that “the Commission shall be fully 
associated in these tasks.”  Every subsequent amendment of the Treaties strengthened the 13
incorporation of the CFSP in the EU legal order, while retaining its specific legal rules and 
institutional mechanisms.   
 The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999 significantly developed the specific CFSP toolbox 
through the introduction of new instruments such as Common Strategies, Common Positions and 
Common Actions. Moreover, the revised Article 11 TEU clarified that the CFSP was no longer to be 
defined and implemented by ‘the Union and its member states’ but by the Union alone.  This also 14
implied significant amendments to the external representation of the CFSP. Even though the 
Council Presidency retained its formal representative function in this area, it was to be assisted by 
the Secretary-General of the Council, who exercised the new function of “High Representative for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy”.  It is no secret that the first High Representative, Javier 15
Solana (1999-2009), often overshadowed the foreign ministers of the Presidency.  He was assisted 16
by a Policy Unit as well as the officials of the Council Secretariat. The Council could also appoint 
 Michael Bruter 'Diplomacy without a state: the external delegations of the European Commission' (1999) 6 Journal 9
of European Public Policy 183; David Spence, 'The European Commission's external service' (2004) 19 Public 
Policy and Administration 61; European Commission (n8); Caterina Carta, The European Union diplomatic service: 
ideas, preferences and identities (Routledge 2012); Edith Drieskens, 'What’s in a Name? Challenges to the Creation 
of EU Delegations' (2012) 7 The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 51; Austermann (n6)
 Simon Nuttall, European Political Cooperation (Clarendon Press 1992); Simon Nuttall, European Foreign Policy 10
(OUP 2000); Michael E Smith, Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation (CUP 
2004).
 Single European Act [1987] OJ L 169, Article 30 11
 See: Ricardo Gosalbo Bono, ‘Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order’ (2016) 43 CMLRev 341. 12
 Pieter Jan Kuijper and others, The Law of EU External Relations: Cases, Materials and Commentary on the EU as 13
an International Legal Actor (OUP 2013), 25.
 As argued by Bono, “the deletion of the reference to Member States meant that the Treaty of Amsterdam discarded 14
this intergovernmental trait of the CFSP introduced by the Maastricht Treaty” (n12) 348. 
 Article 18 (3) TEU (Amsterdam version); Hylke Dijkstra, 'The Council Secretariat's Role in the Common Foreign 15
and Security Policy' (2008) 13 EFARev 149
 Dijkstra, 'EU External Representation in Conflict Resolution' (n7)16
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Special Representatives with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues.   17
 Last but not least, the EU acquired the capacity to conclude international agreements in the 
field of CFSP, leading to a (largely academic) debate about the existence of the Union’s 
international legal personality besides that of the European Community, which was explicitly 
foreseen in the EC Treaty.  This discussion already lost much of its practical relevance after the 18
Treaty of Nice clarified that international agreements in the area of CFSP “shall be binding on the 
institutions of the Union”. The abolition of the pillar structure and the express grant of a single legal 
personality to the Union with the Treaty of Lisbon finally made an end to all possible 
speculations.  It is now crystal clear that the CFSP is an integral part of the autonomous EU legal 19
order and not a separate framework of cooperation subject to general rules of international law.  
3.2.2 The Treaty Framework of EU External Representation 
The Lisbon Treaty aimed to enhance the effectiveness and coherence of the Union’s external 
action.  The dissolution of the pillar structure (Art. 1 TEU), the introduction of a single legal 20
personality for the Union (Art. 47 TEU) and the grouping of all external action principles and 
objectives – including those of the CFSP – in a single Chapter  and a specific Treaty provision 21
(Art. 21 TEU) give the impression of a fully integrated legal framework.  At the institutional level, 22
the new functions of a permanent European Council President (Art. 15 TEU), a double-hatted High 
Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for the consistency of 
the external activities (Art. 18 TEU), assisted by the newly established EEAS (Art. 27 TEU) and 
Union delegations abroad (Art. 221 TFEU), confirm this picture.  
However, upon closer inspection, it is clear that “the proclaimed unity of EU external action 
only extends to its general principles and objectives” whereas the EU’s competence in the field of 
CFSP remains clearly distinct from other categories of competence set out in the TFEU.  Also in 23
the post-Lisbon era, the CFSP remains “subject to specific rules and procedures” (Art. 24 TEU) 
implying a predominant role for the institutions which are assimilated with the executive power 
(European Council and Council) and a limited possibility of judicial review.  The distinctiveness of 24
the CFSP is made explicit in the so-called mutual non-affect clause of Article 40 TEU. According to 
this provision, the implementation of the CFSP shall not affect the application of the procedures and 
 Art. 18 (5) TEU (Amsterdam version). 17
 With regard to this academic discussion, see e.g. Ulrich Everling, 'Reflections on the Structure of the European 18
Union' (1992) 29 CMLRev 1053; Armin von Bogdandy, 'The Legal Case for Unity: The European Union as a Single 
Organization with a Single Legal System' (1999) 36 CMLRev 887; Ramses Wessel, 'Revisiting the International 
Legal Status of the EU' (2000) 5 EFARev 507; Rafael Leal-Arcas, 'EU Legal Personality in Foreign Policy?' (2006) 
24 Boston University International Law Journal 165.
 Art. 1 and 47 TEU (Lisbon version)19
 See e.g. the Commission’s statement on the occasion of the signature of the Lisbon Treaty, claiming that this new 20
legal framework “will enhance efficiency and give the Union a single voice in external relations” (IP/07/1922, 13 
December 2007). For a critical analysis, see Panos Koutrakos, ‘Primary Law and Policy in EU External Relations: 
Moving away from the big picture’ (2008) 33 ELRev 666.  
 Chapter 1 of Title V of the TEU. 21
   See also the contribution by Marise Cremona in this volume. 22
 Koutrakos (n20) 669.23
 Christophe Hillion, 'A powerless court? The European Court of Justice and the Common Foreign and Security 24
Policy' in Marise Cremona and Anne Thies (eds), The European Court of Justice and External Relations Law: 
Constitutional Challenges (Hart Publishing, 2014), 47
!5
the powers of the institutions laid down by the TFEU and vice versa. However, in the absence of 
clear criteria to define the scope of CFSP in relation to other fields of the Union’s external action, 
there is significant potential for inter-institutional conflicts.   25
 The ‘integration-delimitation’ paradox is also reflected with respect to the EU’s external 
representation. On the one hand, the role of the High Representative and the EEAS is to bridge the 
gap between CFSP and the other policy areas in an attempt to improve the coherence of the EU’s 
external action. On the other hand, the limits of this integrated approach become obvious in the 
continued distinction of external representation tasks. The President of the European Council and 
the High Representative represent the Union for CFSP issues at their respective political levels 
whereas the Commission ensures the external representation for the other policy areas.   26
A similar institutional division between CFSP and non-CFSP external action is discernible 
with regard to the procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements and the 
adoption of Union positions in bodies set up by such agreements.  Depending on the subject of the 27
agreement (or position), the Commission or the High Representative can take the initiative. 
Reflecting the internal decision-making procedures, the role of the European Parliament in the 
procedure for concluding international agreements in the field of CFSP is limited to a right of 
information.  In other words, the rules regarding the EU’s external representation are concomitant 28
to the internal division of powers and the constitutional principles on which the EU legal order is 
based. This implies, on the one hand, respect for the principles of conferral and institutional 
balance, implying that the Union and its institutions can only act within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon them in the Treaties  and, on the other hand, respect for the 29
interconnected principles of sincere cooperation and consistency (or coherence), which are 
mitigating (at least partially) the complexities following from the division of competences.   30
3.2.3 The law and politics of EU External Representation in practice 
As the previous section shows, an analysis of the Treaty rules is not sufficient to understand the 
practice of the EU’s external representation. It is equally important to outline some of the political 
dynamics at stake.  
 The first consideration is that of institutional choice. With the Lisbon Treaty, the member 
states have established an advanced institutional framework, through which they can pursue 
common foreign and security policy on the international scene. The CFSP is, however, not the only 
framework. Most of the member states still maintain unilateral diplomatic channels. In this respect, 
it is noteworthy that Declaration 13 to the Treaty of Lisbon underlines that the provisions on the 
 Peter van Elsuwege, 'The Potential for Inter-Institutional Conflicts before the Court of Justice: Impact of the Lisbon 25
Treaty' in Cremona and Thies (n24), 123 
 Art. 15 (6) TEU (President of the European Council); Art. 17 TEU (Commission) and Art. 27 (2) TEU (High 26
Representative). 
 Art. 218 TFEU. 27
 See:  Case C-658/11, European Parliament v. Council (Pirate Transfer Agreement with Mauritius), EU:C:2014:2025 28
and comments in Peter van Elsuwege, ‘Securing the Institutional Balance in the Procedure for Concluding 
International Agreements’ (2015) 52 CMLRev 1379. See also Case C-263/14, European Parliament v. Council 
(Pirate Transfer Agreement with Tanzania), EU:C:2016:435.  
 Art. 5 (2) TEU and Art. 13 (2) TEU. 29
 For comments, see: Peter van Elsuwege and Hans Merket, ‘The Role of the Court of Justice in Ensuring the Unity of 30
the EU’s External Representation’ in Steven Blockmans and Ramses Wessel (eds.), Principles and Practices of EU 
External Representation, CLEER Working Papers, 2012/5, 37. 
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CFSP “do not affect the responsibilities of the Member States […] for the formulation and conduct 
of their foreign policy nor of their national representation in third countries and international 
organisations”. Declaration 14 further specifies that the CFSP “will not affect the existing legal 
basis, responsibilities and powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct 
of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and participation 
in international organisations.” Hence, the existence of an explicit EU competence in the area of 
CFSP (Art. 2 (4) TFEU) does not prevent the member states from deploying their national foreign 
policy instruments.  
The member states are furthermore also bound by their commitments to other international 
organisations. The UN is a key example and the special responsibilities of France and the United 
Kingdom in the Security Council are broadly recognised. On issues of security and defence, NATO 
is furthermore the primary locus of choice for most member states.  While the member states may 31
be happy to support the High Representative and EEAS in general, not all member states may be 
happy to support them on all issues. The politics behind institutional choice are interesting as they 
contrast a functional (which institutional framework can best address the problem?) and political 
logic (which institutional framework would best serve the interests of a member state?) with the EU 
obligations of loyal cooperation.   32
 The Court of Justice has clarified the implications of the loyalty principle, as expressed in 
Article 4 (3) TEU, with respect to the EU’s non-CFSP external action. In essence, the duty of loyal 
cooperation implies that member states may not undermine “a concerted Union strategy” while 
expressing their national position in international fora.  Significantly, such a strategy does not 33
require the adoption of a legally binding document. As soon as a matter is discussed within the EU 
institutions, and even before the formal EU decision-making process enters into force, member 
states are subject to special duties of action (ie actively supporting the EU’s position) and abstention 
(ie refraining from the adoption of positions or actions undermining the EU’s position or internal 
decision-making process). Significantly, the member states’ obligations are of general application, 
irrespective of whether the EU’s competence is of an exclusive or shared nature.   34
The question of course, is to what extent these obligations in relation to the EU’s non-CFSP 
external action equally apply with respect to EU representation in the field of CFSP. Reflecting the 
special status of the CFSP, a specific duty of cooperation is maintained in Article 24 (3) TEU. This 
seems at first sight a redundant repetition taking into account the horizontal nature of the EU’s 
principles and objectives and the mandatory language used in defining the member states’ 
obligations of loyalty in the field of CFSP. Pursuant to Article 24(3), the member states “shall 
support” the Union’s external and security policy, they “shall comply” with the Union’s action in 
this area and “shall refrain” from any action that is contrary to the Union’s interests or is likely to 
impair the effectiveness of its international action as a cohesive external actor.  
Moreover, the text leaves little scope for exceptions as suggested by the expressions 
“actively” and “unreservedly”.  Article 28(2) TEU further specifies that CFSP decisions “commit 35
 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And 31
Security Policy (EEAS 2016) <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/EUGS.pdf> accessed 24 February 2017, 20
 Joseph Jupille, Walter Mattli and Duncan Snidal, Institutional Choice and Global Commerce (CUP 2013); Julia C. 32
Morse and Robert O. Keohane, 'Contested Multilateralism' (2014) 9 The Review of International Organizations 385.
 Case C-246/07, Commission v Sweden [2010] ECR I-3317, para. 103.33
 Ibid., para. 71.34
 Christophe Hillion and Ramses Wessel, ‘Restraining external competences of the Member States under CFSP’ in 35
Marise Cremona and Bruno De Witte (eds) EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Hart 
Publishing 2008), 91
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the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity”. Hence, it 
appears that the importance of the distinction between the general principle of loyal or sincere 
cooperation under Article 4 (3) TEU and its CFSP-specific variant under Article 24 (3) TEU should 
not be overestimated. A noticeable difference, of course, is that the Council and the High 
Representative – rather than the Commission – shall ensure compliance with the loyalty principle in 
the field of CFSP. Whereas Article 24 TEU thus precludes the Commission to bring a Member State 
before the Court of Justice for breaching its duties under the CFSP, Member State actions 
jeopardising the attainment of the Union’s external action objectives nevertheless fall within the 
Court’s jurisdiction in the light of Article 4(3) TEU.     36
 The second consideration is the control of the High Representative and the EEAS. It is well-
known in political science and international relations that the delegation of tasks likely results in an 
agency problem.  In layman's terms: the High Representative and the EEAS have ideas of their 37
own and may want to pursue those against the interests of some of the member states. The member 
states are therefore likely to keep the High Representative and the EEAS weak, under-staffed and 
subject to a whole range of oversight and accountability mechanisms.  Furthermore, they are likely 38
to by-pass the High Representative and the EEAS, if they anticipate that both EU actors will not 
effectively deliver on areas they consider important. A report of the UK House of Lords European 
Committee is quite explicit in this respect, when it stated that “[t]he EEAS should not […] seek to 
project its own foreign policy. The Common Foreign and Security Policy should remain under the 
control of the Member States.”   39
 To better understand this so-called agency problem, it is necessary to identify first what the 
High Representative and the EEAS want to achieve. It is useful to distinguish between institutional 
interests and policy interests. In terms of institutional interests, there have been significant struggles 
between High Representatives, on the one hand, and other EU actors, on the other hand. Javier 
Solana, Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini have all had their challenges with the member 
states, the rotating Presidency and the European Commission.  In terms of policy interest, the EU 40
Treaties are an important guide.  Furthermore, the High Representative and the EEAS have tried to 41
pursue policies in which they have strengths. It is thus not a surprise that they have prioritised non-
traditional threats, conflict prevention and the comprehensive approach, stressing the EU's unique 
 Christophe Hillion, ‘Cohérence et action extérieure de l’Union’ in Eleftheria Neframi (ed.), Objectifs et compétences 36
de l’Union européenne (Bruylant 2012);  see also Hillion (n24)
 Roderick Kiewiet and Matthew McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the 37
Appropriations Process (Chicago University Press 1991); Mark Pollack, The Engines of European Integration: 
Agency, Delegation, and Agenda Setting in the EU (OUP 2003); Darren Hawkins and others (eds), Delegation and 
Agency in International Organizations (CUP 2006); Curtis A Bradley and Judith G Kelley, 'The Concept of 
International Delegation' (2008) 71 Law and Contemporary Problems 1
 Hylke Dijkstra, Policy-Making in EU Security and Defence Policy: An Institutional Perspective (Palgrave 38
Macmillan 2013); Hylke Dijkstra, International Organizations and Military Affairs (Routledge 2016).
 European Union Committee of the House of Lords, The EU's External Action Service (Authority of the House of 39
Lords 19 March 2013) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldeucom/147/147.pdf> 
accessed 24 February 2017.
 Hylke Dijkstra, 'Commission Versus Council Secretariat: An Analysis of Bureaucratic Rivalry in European Foreign 40
Policy' (2009) 14 EFARev 431; Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Rueger (n7); Niklas Helwig and Carolin Rueger,  'In 
Search of a Role for the High Representative: The Legacy of Catherine Ashton' (2014) 49 International Spectator 1
 Article 3(2), 21 TEU41
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crisis toolkit.  This has not always pleased the member states. They notably complained about the 42
disinterest of Ashton in defence, including her skipping a ministerial meeting in 2010.  43
 The High Representative and the EEAS can only pursue interests different from those of the 
member states if they have sufficient resources. Informational advantages are critically important in 
this respect.  The member states accept EU level representation precisely because they cannot 44
carry out all representative functions themselves. As a result of direct EU representation, member 
states lose the ability to control all the interactions that the EU representative has with foreign 
counterparts. After all, they may not be privy to those interactions. Furthermore, few member states 
rival the diplomatic network of the EEAS. This gives the EEAS insight about many third countries. 
The EEAS has also significant in-house expertise and serves as the point of contact for many third 
parties. These advantages allow the High Representative and the EEAS to pursue their interests. 
 Member states are keenly aware of this agency problem. They have installed a range of 
control mechanisms. It is common practice to distinguish between ex ante and ex post control 
mechanisms. The former determine the scope and procedure of a delegated task, while the latter are 
about the monitoring and sanctioning of the High Representative and the EEAS.  EU statements, 45
for example, need to be cleared with the member states. The EEAS and its delegations are packed 
with national diplomats. Changes to the budget, personnel policy or the organisation of the EEAS 
furthermore need to be cleared with the member states. Control and oversight are not necessarily 
explicit. The High Representative and the EEAS typically anticipate that the member states may be 
unhappy with their actions and thus refrain from such actions in the first place. They are responsive 
to the wishes of the membership. 
 The final consideration is one of bureaucratic politics. This goes a step further than the 
question of control. Member states may well be in agreement that it is better to be represented by 
the High Representative and the EEAS in a particular area of the CFSP. Yet this logic may run into 
trouble when considering the parochial interests within the member states. In particular, the 
emergence of the High Representative and the EEAS challenges respectively the foreign ministers 
and the national diplomatic services. We know that institutions are sticky:  they tend to survive 46
even if there is no explicit purpose for them. This can also be said regarding certain tasks of 
national diplomatic services. Typically among the most prestigious bits of government, they have 
proven almost immune to EU foreign policy cooperation and the creation of the EEAS. Few if any 
of the national diplomatic services have downsized as a result of Lisbon.  If anything, they have 47
tried to remain visible and relevant. Instances of bureaucratic politics precisely result from the 
parallel existence of the EEAS and the national diplomatic services and a lack of clarity about the 
 European Council, A Security Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (12 December 2003)  <https://42
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> accessed 17 February 2017; Sophie Vanhoonacker and 
Karolina Pomorska, 'The European External Action Service and agenda-setting in European foreign policy' (2013) 
20 Journal of European Public Policy 1316.
 Valentina Pop, 'Ashton's absence from defence gathering raises eyebrows' EUObserver (Brussels 25 February 2010) 43
<https://euobserver.com/news/29552> accessed 22 February 2017
 Pollack (n37); Hawkins (n37)44
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division of labour.   48
 The combination of the complex legal framework and political reality implies that the 
question of who is representing the EU is not always as straightforward as a cursory reading of the 
Treaties might suggest. The remainder of this contribution analyses different scenarios in order to 
better understand the mechanisms behind the process of EU representation in practice. It focuses 
subsequently on multilateral, bilateral and ad hoc EU external representation.  
3.3 EU External Representation in Multilateral Fora 
The EU’s representation in multilateral fora – understood to include both formal international 
organisations and international regimes – can take different forms oscillating between full 
membership and observer status.  This is the result of various legal and political factors, both 49
inside and outside the EU. First of all, the EU’s capacity to act on the international stage is a matter 
of competence. It is, therefore, no coincidence that full membership is mostly granted in 
international organisations dealing with issues falling within the scope of the EU’s exclusive 
competence or within areas where extensive internal harmonisation took place.  However, there is 50
no direct correlation between strong internal competences and strong participatory rights in 
international organisations.  This is due to the second variable, which is the statute of the 51
international organisation concerned. It determines whether or not the EU can participate and in 
which form.  Whereas the EU may have the competence to be directly represented, the possibility 52
to make use of this competence depends on the institutional framework of the respective bodies.   53
 The EU’s status in international organisations also largely depends upon the position of third 
countries since unanimity, or at least qualified majority, is normally needed to accept a formal role 
for non-state actors. Other countries should thus be convinced that direct EU representation is not 
against their interests.  Last but not least, EU member states are not always keen to give up their 54
position in multilateral fora in favour of a unified EU representation. Membership remains a clear 
expression of national sovereignty and is deemed important to safeguard unilateral influence on the 
international scene. Member states are traditionally reluctant in accepting a stronger role for the EU 
if it comes at the expense of their own representation.  They want to keep their unilateral 55
institutional channels open, allowing them a variety of institutional choices. Arguably, this is even 
more relevant in the area of CFSP, which is a traditional stronghold of member state sovereignty, in 
comparison to non-CFSP contexts where EU external representation more logically follows from 
the EU’s internal competences. Moreover, the most relevant international organisations dealing with 
 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, 'Symbolic power in European diplomacy: the struggle between national foreign services and 48
the EU's External Action Service' (2014) 40 Review of International Studies 657; Dijkstra, 'EU External 
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Eeckhout and Manuel Lopez-Escudero (eds.), The European Union’s External Action in Times of Crisis (Hart 
Publishing, 2016) 304. 
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CFSP matters, such as the UN, NATO or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), are state-centric. Individual member states are members of these organisations on their 
own merits, not as part of some sort of a broader EU external presence.  As a result, attempts to 56
upgrade the EU’s direct representation face legal and political difficulties.  
 This is most clearly illustrated with the development of the EU’s representation in the UN.  57
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the rotating Presidency represented the EU for matters concerning the 
CFSP whereas the Commission represented the European Community. The abolition of the pillar 
structure and the introduction of new rules for external representation under primary EU law (cf. 
supra) triggered a revision of this arrangement. In particular, the replacement of rotating Presidency 
representatives with EU institutional actors had important repercussions. Whereas the Presidency 
representatives could benefit from their state’s UN member status to express the EU's position, this 
was not automatically guaranteed for the EU’s institutional representatives. In line with the EU’s 
observer status, the latter would only be allowed to intervene at the end of the debates and would 
face serious limitations regarding the circulation of official documents and proposals. To avoid such 
detrimental consequences, a diplomatic initiative resulted in the adoption of UNGA Resolution 
65/276 aligning the rules for the participation of the EU in the work of the UN with the provisions 
of the Lisbon Treaty.   58
 The new resolution allowed European Council President Van Rompuy to intervene for the 
first time in the General Debate of the UN General Assembly in September 2011. This was 
considered ‘a major breakthrough in a forum where the promotion of national sovereignty continues 
to be a dominant factor’.  Nevertheless, the process leading to the adoption of this new 59
arrangement also revealed the limits and practical problems of the EU’s representation in 
multilateral fora. In particular, it turned out very difficult to convince third countries about the need 
to upgrade the EU’s rights of representation. Countries from Africa and the Caribbean Community 
(Cariforum) feared that allowing greater participation by the EU might undermine the principle of 
equality among sovereign states and the intergovernmental character of the UN system. This 
opposition lead to significant amendments in comparison to the initial draft of the resolution, 
watering down the EU’s ambitions.  The EU remains somewhat ‘procedurally handicapped’ within 60
the UN system.  For example, as the EU cannot vote in the UN General Assembly, it also cannot 61
give an explanation of vote on behalf of the members. 
 Apart from the opposition from third countries, the implementation of Resolution 65/276 
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also encountered resistance from EU member states. The United Kingdom, in particular, feared that 
the EU’s direct representation might lead to an erosion of national competences. Accordingly, the 
British government actively resisted a so-called ‘representation creep’.  This resulted in a 62
controversy about the right of EU delegations to deliver statements in the name of the EU in the 
area of shared competences. The UK insisted that such statements could only be made ‘on behalf of 
the EU and its member states’ and not simply ‘on behalf of the EU’. A compromise solution was 
found in October 2011, when the Council adopted a document setting out the ‘General 
Arrangements for EU statements in multilateral organisations’.  This discussion is evidence of the 63
importance of the alternative and parallel institutional channels that member states want to keep in 
addition to EU representation. 
 The Council document provides some general principles and practical guidelines. Most 
notably, it addresses the UK’s concerns in pointing out that the EU’s external representation does 
not affect the internal division of competences. The EU can only make a statement when it is 
competent and after a common position has been agreed in accordance with the relevant Treaty 
provisions.  The EU representation is to be exercised from behind the EU nameplate unless 64
prevented by the rules of procedure of the relevant organisation. Member states may complement 
the EU statements as long as they respect the principle of sincere cooperation. When member states 
agree, EU actors can thus express statements relating to issues of national competence. In such 
instances, the statement will be prefaced by ‘on behalf of the member states’. In areas of shared 
competence, the prefix ‘on behalf of the EU and its member states’ will be used and for statements 
referring exclusively to positions adopted in the EU framework, reference will be made to ‘on 
behalf of the European Union’. Significantly, the guidelines provide that the latter practice includes 
the CFSP.     65
 The discussion surrounding the delivery of statements in multilateral fora revealed the key 
distinction between internal coordination and external representation. Once an EU position is 
adopted, this position is to be represented by EU actors externally on the basis of the division of 
labour foreseen in the Treaties. With respect to CFSP matters, this implies that the President of the 
European Council, the High Representative or the EU delegation take the floor on behalf of the EU. 
The member states are bound to coordinate their action and to uphold the EU’s positions whereas 
the High Representative shall organise this coordination.  In practice, this implies that the EU 66
delegations play a crucial role in ensuring ‘on the spot’ coordination. More than 1,000 annual 
coordination meetings take place in New York, Geneva and Vienna ensuring the coherence of the 
EU’s position in the UN and the OSCE.  For international conferences taking place in a location 67
where there is no EU delegation, the member state holding the Presidency may, on an ad hoc basis, 
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chair the ‘on the spot’ internal coordination meetings.    68
 After some teething problems,  it seems that the post-Lisbon arrangements are now more or 69
less established. At the same time, the ambition to further improve the EU’s status in international 
organisations has become more modest. The 2012 Barroso-Aston paper, for instance, called for a 
piecemeal approach, focussing on a limited number of organisations.  However, as can be derived 70
from the CJEU’s judgment relating to the International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV), 
nothing prevents the Union from adopting a position to be defended on its behalf in an a body set up 
by an international agreement to which it is not a party, even when not all member states are a party. 
The only criterion is that the adopted position concerns an area of law which falls within the EU’s 
competence.  Hence, even in a context where EU external representation is not an evident option, 71
the member states are bound to respect their EU law obligations.  
 This also applies with respect to CFSP matters. Article 34(1) TEU provides that ‘[i]n 
international organisations and at international conferences where not all the member states 
participate, those which do take part shall uphold the Union’s positions.’ Accordingly, the member 
states which are members of the Security Council are under a duty to keep the other member states 
and the High Representative fully informed and to defend the positions and the interests of the 
Union.  When the EU has a defined position, the EU member states which sit in the Security 72
Council shall request that the High Representative be invited to defend the EU’s position.  This 73
innovation of the Lisbon Treaty significantly increased the visibility of the EU and allowed the 
High Representative, and particularly the EU delegation to intervene on various occasions.   74
3.4 Bilateral EU External Representation 
While EU external representation in multilateral fora has brought some specific challenges, such as 
voting and speaking rights, getting the appropriate hearing at the bilateral level has hardly been 
easier for the EU. Once again, we see significant variation in EU bilateral representation across the 
globe, which is not easily explained by the EU competences.  Indeed, to understand how external 75
representation on the bilateral level plays out requires us to account for the host country, both in 
terms of its importance for individual member states as well as its attitude towards the EU. 
 As noted earlier, the Commission has long had an extensive network of delegations in other 
countries. These were offices of the Commission, staffed by Commission officials, trying to 
implement European policies from trade to development and enlargement. As the permanent bases 
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of the EU abroad, they became also focal points for issues such as press and public diplomacy. The 
hybrid nature of the Commission delegations, somewhere between technical offices and full-
fledged embassies, obviously resulted in challenges with protocol and accreditation. For instance, 
the Commission staff member appointed as Head of Delegation could not be called an 
‘ambassador’.  Considering the sizeable EU development budgets, it is clear that some of the 76
counterparts would prioritise the Commission Head of Delegation over many of the national 
ambassadors. 
 The Lisbon Treaty was supposed to address some of these challenges. The purpose was to 
turn all the bilateral Commission delegations into upgraded EU delegations consisting of both 
Commission civil servants and seconded European diplomats. This transformation has taken a 
considerable time and has been uneven at best. That the EU has so many bilateral delegations across 
the world allows us to run medium or large-n analyses of external representation. Austermann has 
done just that.  She shows how Commission delegations have been upgraded to EU delegations at 77
'different speeds'. One of her findings – that EU diplomacy is least centralised in major economic 
partners – is perhaps surprising from the perspective of the EU's exclusive competence in this 
area,  but it is completely unsurprising when considering the significant interests of the individual 78
member states in places like Washington or Beijing. Particularly when host countries matter, it is 
unlikely that the member states let the EEAS and its delegations get in their way. 
 The significance of the host country for the individual member states is also underlined by 
Balfour and Raik, who note that EU delegations have “been relatively easy to establish in less 
important and peripheral locations where member states have fewer political interests at play … 
The easiest cases are locations where one's own country has no representation”.  Indeed they find 79
that Washington, Beijing, New Delhi, Moscow, Cairo, and Tokyo are places where member states 
want to avoid that their bilateral channels get compromised.  Dijkstra argues that these are 80
instances of what he calls “non-exclusive delegation”; the member states have delegated to the EU 
delegations a role in bilateral representation, but this role is hardly exclusive and (re)negotiated on a 
daily basis (not dissimilar to EU representation in multilateral fora).  81
 It is impossible to describe the local dynamics in all the countries where the EU entertains 
bilateral relations, but scholars have analysed the nitty-gritty details of setting up several EU 
delegations after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.  It is worth highlighting some of their 82
key findings, because these findings show us the importance of local variables affecting EU 
external representation. To start with China, we have witnessed the appearance of an interesting de 
facto division of labour between the member states and the EU. Whereas the member states 
themselves are in fierce competition regarding trade promotion and investment, they collectively 
have been happy to leave the difficult political dossiers (arms embargo, climate change, human 
rights, intellectual property rights, the market economy status) to the EU. The EU has proved a 
convenient cover shielding the bilateral trading interests. This is in line with intra-EU principal-
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agent dynamics outlined above. 
 Austermann has analysed this intra-EU political dynamic in greater detail with respect to the 
institutionalisation of the EU delegation in Beijing. She writes that “[d]espite the clearly upgraded 
political role, the EU Delegation cannot do away with … the diverging interests of member states. 
This makes it difficult to speak always with one voice in Beijing”.  Indeed, the member states were 83
pleased to have the Head of Delegation speak about human rights, such as in the case of the 
detention of Ai Weiwei, but refused to allow him to speak on behalf of the whole EU.  He could 84
only make a statement on his own behalf. It is clear from the Beijing example that member states 
have different channels for bilateral representation and they use them strategically. 
 While the division of labour between the member states and the EU institutions is thus 
critically important for bilateral representation, it is not the full story. As with the multilateral fora, 
one also needs to account for the local environment. A comparison between EU delegation in 
Washington and Moscow is instructive.  The way in which the US and Russian administrations 85
systematically play around with the corps diplomatique (in different ways) also affects how the EU 
is represented externally. 
 Maurer notes the diplomatic circus in Washington is a constant “beauty contest”.  The 86
ambition for diplomatic actors is to gain the attention of the US administration. As such individual 
member states have been deeply suspicious of any bilateral role of the EU delegation, particularly 
not in the area of political and security affairs.  While this finding seems paradoxical considering 87
that in Beijing member states precisely delegated such tasks, it shows the significance of the local 
environments. The EU delegation in Washington has tried to stick to core EU competences, such as 
transatlantic trade, and to ensure that the EU effort would be complementary at the service of the 
member states. One example has been organising briefing meetings with US counterparts for all EU 
diplomats at the same time. The US administration has been supportive of this. As Maurer and Raik 
write, “in Washington it is difficult to reach a high-ranking official ... The US had actively pushed 
the idea of meeting all EU member states ... at the same time ... even before the Lisbon Treaty ... 
such exchanges with the EU28 have become standard practice.”  88
 The environment in Moscow is quite different. The Russian effort has focused on divide-
and-rule and, as such, Russian officials have not been keen to meet the EU28 collectively.  Access 89
is generally restricted and Moscow has had little interest in EU-level officials, preferring to deal 
with more high-level national (e.g. German) officials. Maurer and Raik note that this Russian 
attitude has pushed diplomats of the EU member states closer together,  particularly since the 90
annexation of Crimea and the establishment of the EU sanctions regime in 2014. For our 
understanding of EU external representation more broadly, however, it is once again significant to 
account for this local environment in which bilateral representation takes place. 
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3.5 Ad hoc EU External Representation  
While multilateral and bilateral diplomacy tend to be institutionalised, ad hoc forms of external 
representation may allow the EU institutions a greater presence. Yet what we have seen, particularly 
with respect to high-level mediation, are a variation of formats through which the EU and its 
member states are represented. Indeed, also with ad hoc forms of external representation, there 
seem important internal and external variables at play. Furthermore, while ad hoc external 
representation implies one-off events, it oftentimes consists of a process of meditation, persisting 
for years and resulting in a strong degree of path dependence. 
 There is a relatively long tradition of EU representatives participating in ad hoc diplomacy. 
Perhaps most infamously, the so-called Troika consisting at the time of the rotating Presidency and 
its predecessor and successor sought to mediate in the erupting conflict in former Yugoslavia in 
1991.  Similarly, former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt was the EU envoy and Vice-Chair of 91
the Dayton conference in 1995, even though his position was informally undermined by the British 
and French representatives also present.  These experiences, and the lack of EU success in the 92
Western Balkans, provided direct input for the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999, which established the 
position of the EU High Representative (a continuous position to assist the rotating Presidency) and 
codified the EU Special Representatives, which would be appointed by the member states to give 
the EU representation in some of the world's most important conflicts. 
 The first High Representative, Javier Solana, was particularly active in terms of ad hoc 
external representation. Perhaps because the rules of ad hoc diplomacy are less set in stone, this was 
an area where he could make a name for himself. As High Representative, Solana was instrumental 
– together with NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson – in negotiating the OHRID peace 
agreement for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001. From 2003, he became the 
negotiator on behalf of the international community with Iran on nuclear non-proliferation. This 
paved the way for the later “successes” of Ashton and Mogherini. Solana's biggest coup, however, 
was securing a seat on behalf of the EU in the Middle-East Quartet in 2004. Importantly, he did not 
have to “share” this seat with other European representatives. He was a full member together with 
the American and Russian foreign ministers as well as the UN Secretary-General.  
 That the “appointment” of EU representatives in ad hoc external representation goes beyond 
formal competences is perhaps best illustrated by Solana's mediation during the Israeli-Lebanese 
war in 2006.  The member states were confused and disagreed, but Solana simply stepped on a 93
plane. Asked by reporters on the ground whether he would lead mediation attempts, he noted that “I 
am not going to tell you about any potential way of solving [the conflict]. My visit today here is a 
visit of friendship, of solidarity and support”.  Several days later, he was back in Brussels where he 94
briefed the EU foreign ministers, who gave him a lead role with respect to mediation. The situation 
was different in 2008, when Russia intervened in Georgia, and the French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy put himself forward as the rotating Presidency in negotiating a peace deal. Solana travelled 
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with Sarkozy to Moscow and Tbilisi, but was all but ignored.  95
 When Lady Catherine Ashton succeeded Solana in 2009, there were questions as to whether 
she would continue such activism, as she had less diplomatic experience. Nevertheless, a significant 
dose of institutional path dependence allowed her to continue the role of the High Representative in 
the Quartet and the Iran negotiations. The Middle-East Quartet became significantly less important 
during her tenure due to a lack of developments on the ground, but she put significant efforts into 
the Iran negotiations. Despite the fact that most observers were happy to see her leave Brussels in 
2014, there was a suggestion to keep her on as the main negotiator to bring the Iran negotiations to 
a successful close.  The new High Representative Mogherini indeed kept her on for another round 96
of negotiations, but quietly replaced her soon afterwards to benefit from the eventual deal.  
 In addition to Iran, mediation in the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo provides a good 
example of ad hoc diplomacy. Initially, Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari represented the EU in 
negotiations with Serbia and Russia.  Significantly, the appointment of Martti Ahtisaari as the EU 97
mediator was an initiative of the German Council Presidency in 1999. It was not based on a formal 
procedure and, for this reason, his status and mandate always remained somewhat unclear.  98
Moreover, the Council had already formally appointed Wolfgang Petritsch as the EU Special Envoy 
to Kosovo.  Notwithstanding this ambiguity surrounding the EU’s representation, the negotiations 99
between Ahtisaari and the Russian ambassador Chernomyrdin paved the way for the adoption of 
Security Council Resolution 1244. This provided for the departure of Serbian troops and the 
deployment of an international civilian and security mission.  
 After Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008, the EU played a 
crucial role in the process of reconciliation with Serbia. From 2011, under the leadership of Lady 
Ashton, the EEAS  started a so-called ‘facilitated dialogue’ between Belgrade and Pristina.  The 100
EU’s mediation efforts successfully resulted in a series of agreements concerning Kosovo’s external 
representation (2012), the acceptance of key principles governing the normalisation of relations 
(2013) and issues such as energy, telecoms, the status of the Serb-majority municipalities in 
Kosovo, and freedom of movement over the Mitrovica bridge (2015). It was an example of classic, 
tiresome, long-term diplomacy coupled with sweeteners, such as the EU candidate status for Serbia 
and the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Kosovo. Significantly, acting through 
the EU’s institutional structures allowed the member states to circumvent the delicate issue of 
recognition. This explains why the SAA with Kosovo is concluded by the EU alone and not by the 
EU and its member states.    101
 While the EU institutions and their representatives have become serious actors in diplomacy, 
it is also important to point at some setbacks. The conflict between Ukraine and Russia clearly 
illustrates that the EU can only play a meaningful role if this is acceptable for all parties involved. 
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When Ashton decided to fly to Kyiv in January 2014 to mediate between President Yanukovich and 
the opposition, Russian President Vladimir Putin quickly dismissed her initiative.  Subsequently, 102
crisis diplomacy was conducted by the foreign ministers of France, Germany and Poland – the so-
called ‘Weimar triangle’ – acting ‘in close coordination’ with EU High Representative Ashton.   103
 Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the escalation of violence in the eastern part 
of Ukraine, the EU’s institutional actors gradually got sidelined. At the Minsk I negotiations, the EU 
was represented by an unusual troika of Ashton, Trade Commissioner De Gucht and Energy 
Commissioner Oettinger. At the Minsk II negotiations, there were no EU institutional actors. 
Instead, the President of France and the Chancellor of Germany were represented. Switzerland, as 
the OSCE Chairman-in-office, played an important coordinating role. This constellation reflected 
Russia’s reluctance to let EU actors play a role in questions of security and foreign policy. Instead, 
the preference is for intergovernmental discussions under the so-called ‘Normandy format’, 
involving the leaders of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine.   
4. Conclusion  
EU external representation remains a puzzle for all but the closest observers. Whereas the EU is 
represented in one conflict by someone from the EU institutions, in other conflicts several member 
states may take a lead role, and in yet other conflicts there is no common EU representation and/or 
position to speak off. While academics have long been interested in the question 'who speaks for 
Europe?', they have failed to come up with definite answers. The Treaty of Lisbon, rather than 
solving this question for once and for all, has created new challenges for EU external representation 
across the world. In this chapter we have not provided definite answers, but we have offered a new 
way of understanding EU external relations by analysing more explicitly the interaction of legal and 
political dynamics. 
 For us, it is clear that while the EU Treaties have increasingly expanded the scope for 
collective EU external representation by EU agents, most recently with the Lisbon Treaty, one 
needs to recognise that there are a range of internal and external political and legal dynamics that 
constrain and enable the ability of the EU to fully represent itself. For instance, the upgrading of the 
Commission delegations to EU delegations have been uneven, and the EU delegations have not yet 
reached their full potential. While some of these dynamics have been previously discussed in the 
academic literature (and been applied to individual case studies), it is worth to comprehensively 
sum up the most important constrains and enables for EU external representation. 
 With respect to intra-EU politics, there is an important tension between sovereignty ability 
of the individual member states to make their own institutional choices and their legal obligations to 
follow the EU line. Institutional choice by the member states (whether they act unilaterally or 
through EU channels) when addressing cooperation problems is well-discussed in the international 
relations literature, whereas legal scholars have been interested in loyal cooperation. Yet to fully 
understand how the trade-off works out in practice requires us to take an interdisciplinary point of 
view. Indeed, a lot of discussion about 'representation creep' in the UN concerns political arguments 
dressed up in legal terminology. Alternatively, France and the United Kingdom have continuously 
refused to be loyal member states when it comes to the Security Council, quoting their conflicting 
obligations under the UN Charter. 
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 It is, however, not only about how to most effectively promote national interest or solve a 
cooperation problem. Member states have also been worried about agency drift by the EU agents. In 
addition, we have seen strong bureaucratic politics dynamics at play. National embassies in places 
such as Washington have been worried of losing their access to local counterparts. The different 
rotating Presidencies across the multilateral fora have not been all too-happy of giving up their own 
roles. At the same time, the member states occasionally use EU representation strategically, for 
instance to shift the blame. Beijing is a key location where the EU is in charge of addressing some 
of the more difficult dossiers. 
 What our overview of EU external representation has also shown is that we need to look 
beyond intra-EU legal and political dynamics. It is not sufficiently understood in the current 
academic literature that a critical condition for effective EU representation is actually external and 
has to do with the environment in which representation takes place. Simply put, other states should 
be actually willing to meet EU representatives. If they are not, there is rather little that the EU can 
do about it. The importance of such external conditions are perhaps most obvious when it comes to 
the EU's dealings with the great powers. The EU has had a particularly hard time dealing with 
Russia (be it over Georgia or Ukraine). Yet it is not just about power politics. In the UN context, 
other (weaker) regional groupings have been able to relatively easily frustrate efforts for more EU 
representation. The EU, as a non-state actor, remains the odd one out in a world of sovereign states 
and this significantly conditions its ability to externally represent itself.
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